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REGULATORY COMPLEXITY IN AUSTRALIAN RETAIL INDUSTRY 
AUSTRALIAN WORKPLACE AGREEMENTS 
  
 
 
In Australia in 1996 the Liberal/National Party coalition government passed 
the Workplace Relations Act to enable employers and employees to 
individualise employment relationships through the use of Australian 
Workplace Agreements (AWAs).  Recently this legislation was amended 
(Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 2005, Cth) to 
encourage further use of AWAs. The addition of AWAs to existing 
industrial instruments has exacerbated the confusion created by an already 
complex Australian industrial regulatory environment (Bray and Waring, 
2005; Fetter & Mitchell 2004; Stewart 2005). The purpose of the current 
research is to examine a number of issues of complexity in the regulatory 
structure of AWAs.  Our preliminary analysis of data from 200 Retail 
industry AWAs suggests that AWAs provide another overlapping layer of 
regulation, the precise legal effect of which is unclear, as are the effects on 
employees. While the potential clearly exists under the Australian 
regulatory environment for employers to devise innovative individual 
agreements that reward performance and meet the needs of both the 
employer and the employee, our research suggests that this has not occurred. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades the Australian industrial relations system has become less centralised with 
the diminution of the role of the conciliation and arbitration system, and its product, industry 
wide awards. At the same time, there has been a shift towards regulating terms and conditions 
of employment at the enterprise level (Burgess and Macdonald, 2003; Creighton & Stewart, 
2000: 21).  A range of options are available to employers who have chosen to move away 
from the centralised conciliation and arbitration system, of which industrial awards were a by-
product. While there has previously been no legal requirement to limit employment terms and 
conditions to those that appear in an industry wide award, few employers have availed 
themselves of the option to regulate employment conditions at enterprise level (Creighton & 
Stewart, 2000: 20). More recently, Australian state and federal governments of all political 
persuasions have legislated to actively promote the determination and regulation of 
employment terms and conditions at the enterprise level. The broader range of regulatory 
options provides employers with the opportunity to reward high performing individuals, or 
conversely, to adopt a cost minimisation approach to the use of labour. This has led to a 
situation where the terms of employment can be regulated by state and federal legislation; 
state or federal awards; state or federal registered collective enterprise agreements, with or 
without union involvement; state or federally registered or non-registered individual 
contracts, or combinations of all four regulatory options.  While one of the Howard federal 
government’s professed rationales for changes to the regulatory structure was to make the 
workplace relations system simpler (Howard, 2005: 39), the sheer range of options available 
indicates that this is unlikely to be the case.  
 
In Australia, one of the major federal government policy drivers has been to promote the use 
of registered individual contracts, or Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs) to regulate 
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the terms and conditions of employment. AWAs, as a regulatory instrument, have been 
heavily promoted by the federal government, as a means of individualising the employment 
relationship and rewarding high performing employees (ACIRRT 1999: 76). More recently, 
academic research into AWAs suggests the opposite, that AWAs have been used as a means 
of reducing the terms and conditions of employment (van Barneveld & Arsovska 2001; Roan 
et al. 2000). Researchers also argue that the potential for employees to experience 
disadvantage under AWAs is greater than that currently existing under collective agreements, 
in part because the power dynamics of operating as an individual are less than when 
employees operate as a collective, either with or without a union (van Barneveld & Waring 
2002: 114). Similarly, researchers question whether AWAs are individualised at all, since the 
Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA) provides ‘framework’ or ‘template’ agreements 
on their website (Burgess, Lewer & Waring 2004). Indeed, the lack of substantive 
individualisation has been noted elsewhere (Leonard 2001). While the rationale for employer 
and federal government promotion of AWAs is contested, as is the degree of 
individualisation, what is of interest here is the degree to which AWAs add to an already 
complex regulatory environment. 
 
The difficulties posed by this variety of regulatory options have recently been highlighted by 
Bray and Waring (2005) and Stewart (2005). In particular, Bray and Waring (2005: 1) 
contend that issues of complexity and congruence in the regulatory structure have generally 
been overlooked in existing studies of the Australian regulatory structure due to inadequate 
‘theoretical and methodological assumptions’. While the broader aim of this research project 
is to explore the complexity and congruence of the regulation in the retail industry, this paper 
examines the complexity and congruence of registered individual contracts, or Australian 
AWAs, made in the retail industry under the federal jurisdiction.  
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We begin with a review of the literature on regulatory complexity and then provide some 
background on research into AWAs in Australia.  A description of the data source and 
methodology follows.  Then we present the preliminary results of our empirical study carried 
out on the content of a sample of two hundred AWAs from the retail industry. 
 
REGULATORY COMPLEXITY 
Bray & Waring (2005) argue that there are three aspects of the nature of employment 
regulation in Australia that have not been identified or examined in any depth. These are the 
horizontal complexity or the layering of regulation, vertical complexity or parallel regulation, 
and the congruence of regulation or ‘fit’ between rules from different regulatory sources 
(Bray & Waring 2005: 3). Horizontal complexity can occur because new regulation does not 
always fully replace old regulations.  New regulatory instruments have a tendency to 
supplement instead of entirely replace the instruments they are amending.  As well, horizontal 
complexity exists where different aspects of employment are determined at different levels, 
by legislation, awards or collective agreements, or where different instruments apply to the 
same employment issue. The existence of horizontal complexity in the Australian industrial 
relations system has long been acknowledged (Rimmer 1988; McGrath-Champ, 2003; 
Stewart 2005).  
 
Vertical complexity, or parallel regulation, relates to the potential for the employment 
conditions of different groups of employees within the same enterprise or industry to be 
regulated by different instruments (Bray & Waring 2005: 6). For example, Rimmer (1988: 22) 
identifies the use by Queensland retailers of enterprise level awards for groups such as 
‘nightfillers’ in supermarkets and retail warehouse employees. He explains this as an 
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employer reaction to relatively stringent restrictions on flexible employment practices within 
the Queensland jurisdiction (Rimmer 1988: 24). In part, vertical complexity results also from 
the capacity for different trade unions to have coverage of different classifications of workers 
within the one enterprise (Bray & Waring 2005: 7). The Australian Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (AWIRS) in 1995 identified a propensity for multi unionism (Morehead et 
al. 1997: 146-151). AWIRS, however, did not examine the effects of this complexity 
(Morehead et al., 1997: 205-210).  
 
The third aspect of complexity is the congruence, or ‘fit’, between different regulatory 
instruments. In order to assess congruence, the clauses and provisions in awards, collective 
agreements and AWAs need to be compared to assess the degree to which they differ (Bray & 
Waring 2005: 8-9).  
 
Stewart (2005: 214), however, stresses that Bray and Waring (2005) ‘understate the practical 
difficulties that may arise in determining the legal relationship between such instruments’, as 
the precise legal relationship between regulatory instruments is unclear. The ‘Work Choices’ 
amendments to the Workplace Relations Act (WRA)1996 (Cth) have exacerbated the lack of 
clarity between various regulatory instruments. The WRA states that ‘only one workplace 
agreement can have effect at a particular time’ (s348(1)) and ‘to the extent of any 
inconsistency, a workplace agreement displaces prescribed conditions of employment 
specified in a Commonwealth law that is prescribed by the regulations’ (s350). However, the 
provisions of some State laws continue to apply in the case of ‘(a) occupational health and 
safety; (b) workers compensation; (c) apprenticeship, and (d) any other matter prescribed by 
the regulations’. Fetter and Mitchell (2004: 277) assert that ‘it is possible to draft an AWA to 
cut away almost all of the other forms of regulation….with the consequence that an 
6 
employee’s conditions may be set effectively by a single instrument’, yet their research 
findings suggest that this is rarely the case in practice.  The precise legal status of an AWA in 
relation to other regulatory instruments remains unclear (Fetter & Mitchell 2004: 278; Stewart 
2005: 214; Plowman 2002: 11), as precisely how this layering of regulation will resolve itself 
is yet to be legally tested (Fetter & Mitchell 2004: 278; Stewart 2005: 214). 
 
Leaving aside the legal standing of overlapping regulation, Fetter and Mitchell’s (2004) 
research into the legal interaction of AWAs and other regulatory instruments highlights a 
range of important issues.  Firstly, ‘many AWAs (deliberately or inadvertently) draw back 
into the employment relationship terms and conditions contained in external instruments’ 
(Fetter & Mitchell 2004: 277)..Of the 500 AWAs examined by Fetter and Mitchell (2004: 
290), 91.2 per cent made no reference to an employment contract, 6.4 per cent expressly 
denied the operation of an independent contract, while 2.4 per cent recognised the operation 
of an independent contract. In relation to the existence of a position description, 70 per cent of 
the AWAs examined made no reference to one, while 30 per cent of AWAs contained a 
position description (Fetter & Mitchell 2004: 292). In relation to employee adherence to 
company policy, 53.2 per cent made no reference to company policy, 37.8 per cent stated that 
employees must observe company policy, 8 per cent said the employee should observe 
company policy, except where it was inconsistent with the AWA, and 1 per cent provided for 
consultation with employees with regard to changes to company policy (Fetter & Mitchell 
2004: 293). These findings suggest that employers are not using AWAs as a means of 
developing individualised employment arrangements that reward performance and enable the 
retention of high performing individuals.  
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Many of the AWAs examined by Fetter and Mitchell continued to retain links to other forms 
of regulation. Twenty nine per cent of AWAs made no reference to an award, while 44 per 
cent explicitly excluded the operation of an award, 25 per cent preserved the award except 
where provisions were inconsistent, and 2 per cent recognised the award in some manner 
(Fetter & Mitchell 2004: 295). Notably, of the 44 per cent of AWAs that explicitly stated the 
award ‘did not apply’, a small proportion continued to retain clauses that referred to the award 
(Fetter & Mitchell 2004: 296). The overlap was less dramatic in relation to certified 
agreements. Some 94.4 per cent of AWAs made no reference to a certified agreement, while 
2.2 per cent specifically excluded the operation of a certified agreement, 2.8 per cent 
preserved the terms of a certified agreement to the extent that it was not inconsistent, and 0.6 
per cent provided for a certified agreement to prevail over an AWA. Fetter and Mitchell 
(2004) emphasise the regulatory complexity that results from this overlap of regulatory 
instruments. The current research replicates their research to some extent, and then extends it 
to explore different patterns of labour regulation within AWAs in one industry.  Specifically, 
we develop and apply a methodology to increase our knowledge of the inter-relationships 
between various sources of labour regulation examining the horizontal complexity within a 
sample of AWAs from the retail industry, in order to draw conclusions about the degree to 
which employers have used AWAs to reward individual performance. 
  
METHODOLOGY 
Data for our research is based on a random sample of two hundred ‘retail industry’ AWAs 
provided by the Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA).  The agreements, one hundred 
each from New South Wales and Queensland date from 2002 to 2005, but were all current at 
September 2005.  A key limitation of our sample concerns the representativeness of the data.  
We found that the AWAs were classified as ‘retail industry’ not by the employee job, but 
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rather by the industry classification applying to the employing organisation.  Given the size 
and diversity of retail organisations, not all workers whose AWAs were included in the 
sample would normally be classified as ‘retail workers’.  For example, some AWAs were for 
journalists, boilermakers, storeman and packers, clerical and motor mechanics employed 
within retail organisations.  Thus a limitation of our findings is that they may not necessarily 
be representative of what might generally be considered as traditional retail jobs, such as 
check-out operators and sales assistants.   
 
Additionally, the AWAs provided by the OEA lacked personal identifying information in 
order to meet privacy obligations.  Thus, it was not possible to ascertain basic demographic 
data, such as age or gender.  Nor was it possible to determine if the AWAs originated from 
different organisations, although differences in font and format suggested that most did.  
Another issue of potential concern in the generalisation of our findings is the diversity of 
wage and salary rates identified within our sample.  Just over half of the AWAs (55.5%) bore 
details of an hourly, weekly, fortnightly, or annual pay rate.  The lowest rate identified was 
$5.84 per hour, while the highest rate stated was an annual salary of $132,730.  On almost one 
half of the AWAs (48%) it was not possible to determine employment status.  Of the 
agreements indicating job classifications, twenty-eight percent (56) covered full-time 
positions, eleven percent (22) covered part-time jobs, and the remaining thirteen percent (26) 
covered casual work arrangements.  Neither were we aware of the size of the organisations 
providing the agreements to the OEA.  Given these limitations, we advise caution in drawing 
conclusions about the broader population of retail employees. 
 
Each AWA was coded, using as categories the twenty allowable award matters that existed 
pre 27 March 2006. .  In addition, we collected data on salary reviews, training, changing 
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shifts, employee share ownership schemes, freedom of association clauses, and dress/uniform 
provisions.  Although not coded in the data analysis process, some extra provisions were 
identified in a number of the AWAs.  These miscellaneous issues included provisions for: 
breakages and cash shortages, staff meetings, alcohol and drug policies, multi-hiring, closed 
circuit surveillance systems, and leave for picnic days, emergency services activities and  
employee birthdays. 
 
To determine the horizontal complexity of our sample, we coded the provisions (e.g., meal 
breaks, bereavement leave) of each agreement under categories reflecting the source of the 
regulation.  For example, termination clauses were examined and coded as to whether they 
referred directly to an award, legislation, a certified agreement, or whether other arrangements 
were specified on the AWA.  
 
We coded each agreement’s relationship with existing awards.  The two categories were: 
comprehensive agreements and supplementary agreements.  A comprehensive agreement is 
one that supersedes and operates ‘to the exclusion of all previous awards and agreements 
allowing wages and conditions to be drawn from one source (with the exception of any 
overriding legislation)’ (DEWR/OEA 2004: 25). Typical wording on a comprehensive 
agreement was: ‘this AWA is intended to override any award, enterprise agreement, previous 
AWA or contract that would otherwise apply.’  In contrast, the typical clause on a 
supplementary agreement stated: ‘except as provided by the AWA, the conditions of 
employment of the employee to whom this AWA applies shall be those contained in the 
(name of the relevant award or certified agreement)’.  
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FINDINGS 
Seventy-one per cent of AWAs (142) in the sample were identified as being comprehensive 
(see figure 1), a considerably higher proportion than Fetter and Mitchell (2004) identified in 
their sample (viz., 44 per cent).  Prior to undertaking our analyses, the two data sets were 
compared to check for any systematic differences as the sample of AWAs were drawn from 
organisations in two Australian states.  A two-way contingency table analysis showed that the 
AWA’s state of origin was not significantly related to whether an agreement was 
comprehensive or supplementary (χ2 (1, 200) = .53, NS).   
 
Fig. 1: Proportion of comprehensive and supplementary AWAs by state 
Comprehensive agreements Supplementary agreements
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Under Division 7, Subdivision A of the WRA, all workplace agreements are required to: 
specify a nominal expiry date (s352), include dispute settlement procedures (s353), contain, 
or are assumed to contain, protected award conditions, unless excluded or modified by the 
agreement (s354), and may ‘call up’ terms from other workplace agreements or awards, but 
not those made under state legislation (s355). In the case of an absence of dispute resolution 
procedures, the process outlined in Part13 of the WRA are taken to be included (s353(2)). 
Roan et al. (2001: 394) noted that 40 per cent of the AWAs they examined did not include 
reference to dispute resolution and 46 per cent failed to mention anti-discrimination 
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provisions, despite these being the only required clauses in AWAs at the time of their 
research. Our findings are not as dramatic.  
 
Table 1 provides a snapshot of the regulatory complexity of our sample.  From Table 1 we see 
that 28 per cent of comprehensive AWAs failed to mention discrimination and only 1 per cent 
failed to include a dispute resolution clause. There was no evidence of substantive 
individuality though, as 72 per cent of all comprehensive agreements just provided a link to 
the anti-discrimination legislation. Of the dispute resolution clauses, 43 per cent of all 
comprehensive agreements linked to the legislation (36 per cent for supplementary), while 56 
per cent of comprehensive agreements (59 per cent for supplementary) stated dispute 
resolution provisions. Since the amended WRA no longer allows dispute resolution by 
arbitration within the AIRC, and indeed explicitly states (s701(4)) that ‘the Commission does 
not have the power to: compel a person to do anything; or to arbitrate the matter, or matters in 
dispute’, this potentially will have profound consequences for employees as the legislation 
has limited available options for employees seeking dispute resolution. Typically those 
agreements with stated dispute resolution provisions, set out a number of procedures 
involving the employee and different levels of management should the dispute remain 
unresolved after the first meeting. While the resolution of conflict at workplace level should 
ensure a more participative process between employers and their workers, this would need to 
be investigated further in order to draw any conclusions from the findings.   
 
The provision of superannuation for most of the workforce is legislated for under the 
Superannuation Guarantee Administration Act, 1992 (Cth). This act provides that employers 
shall contribute a minimum of 9 per cent of an employee’s gross earnings into a 
superannuation fund, with the exception of workers who are 70 or over, under 18 and working 
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less than 30 hours per week, or who earn less than $450 per calendar month. Of the AWAs 
examined, 98 per cent of comprehensive and 69 per cent of supplementary agreements 
included provisions for superannuation, while 2 per cent of comprehensive agreements and 31 
per cent of supplementary agreements did not. All AWAs that referred to superannuation 
linked back to the provisions in the Act.  There appears therefore to be no attempt to 
individualise superannuation in order to reward individual employees. 
 
Table 1: Proportion of regulatory layering (%) in mandatory clauses & termination clauses 
 Termination Superannuation Anti-discrimin. Dispute resolut 
 C 
n = 142 
S 
n = 58 
C 
n = 142 
S 
n = 58 
C 
n = 142 
S 
n = 58 
C 
n = 142 
S 
n = 58 
Not stated 4 34 2 31 28 12 1 5 
Award 42 19       
Legislation 14 7 98 69 72 88 43 36 
Specified on AWA 30 21     56 59 
No notice required 2 14       
One week’s notice 8 5       
 
In relation to clauses containing termination arrangements, and notice of termination, 42 per 
cent of all comprehensive AWAs actually referred back to provisions in the relevant award, 
14 per cent stated that these provisions were set under legislation, 4 per cent did not state any 
termination arrangements and 30 per cent specified the arrangements in the AWA. A further 
two per cent of comprehensive AWAs stated that no notice was required, while 8 per cent 
stipulated that one week’s notice by either party was the arrangement. It was notable that 56 
per cent of all comprehensive AWAs actually included links to termination provisions 
detailed elsewhere. This layering of regulation assumes greater importance if the provisions in 
other regulatory instruments are diminished, although the periods of notice under the 
amended WRA remain the same as previously.  
13 
 
To enable further comparisons of regulatory complexity, the data set was reduced (where 
applicable) to remove agreements from analysis where the job classification was unknown (n 
= 96) or where the job was casual (n = 26), since a number of the employee conditions 
analysed do not apply to casual positions (e.g., sick leave or redundancy provisions).  The 
remaining data set contained 55 comprehensive agreements and 23 supplementary 
agreements.  Table 2 presents these findings.    
 
Table 2: Proportion of regulatory layering (%) in long service leave, redundancy clauses and 
parental leave 
 Long Service Leave Redundancies Parental Leave 
 C 
n = 142 
S 
n = 58 
C 
n = 55 
S 
n = 23 
C 
n = 104 
S 
n = 41 
Not stated 11 28 20 22 32 85 
Award 1 5 20 22   
Legislation 77 43 6  66 12 
Specified on AWA 1 2 49 13 2 3 
Not paid – ‘all-up’ rate 9 19 5 43   
‘Buy-out’ provisions 1 3     
 
 
Under the provisions of the Industrial Relations Act 1999 (Qld), and Long Service Leave Act 
1955 (NSW), long service leave is provided for all employees, including casual workers, if 
they have completed a period of continuous service.  Table 2 shows that 77 per cent of 
comprehensive AWAs linked to legislation compared to 43 per cent for supplementary 
agreements.  Four agreements in our sample had ‘buy-out’ long service leave provisions.  All 
of these AWAs enabled the employee to ‘cash out’ all, or part of, any long service 
entitlements.  Two of these agreements also allowed the employee to take long service leave 
at double pay, thereby halving the duration of the available leave.  In all, twenty-four AWAs 
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did not provide for long service leave.  Half of these agreements were identified as ones 
belonging to casual employees, who are entitled to such leave.  Typically on these AWAs 
provisions were grouped together as ‘accrued entitlements’ (viz., annual, sick, personal, 
redundancy, and long service leave).  On these AWAs, long service leave accrued prior to the 
date of operation of the agreement would be paid upon employment termination.  No long 
service leave though accrued from the date that the AWA came into operation. These 
employees were clearly disadvantaged in terms of their employment conditions.  
 
As redundancy or severance pay provisions are not provided for casual employees, we used 
our reduced data set to examine our sample.  Of the AWAs examined, 20 per cent of 
comprehensive and 22 per cent of supplementary agreements were linked to awards.  As well, 
6 per cent of comprehensive AWAs linked to legislation.  Forty-nine per cent of the 
comprehensive agreements set out their own redundancy provisions.  Usually these conditions 
were more generous to the employee than those provided under awards or legislation.  For 
example, for employees of large organisations to reach the maximum entitlement the period 
of continuous years of service was shorter (viz., 6 years and over compared to 10 years and 
over - Vehicle Industry- Repair, Services and Retail Award 2002).  As well, the maximum 
entitlement paid was larger (viz., 16 weeks’ pay compared to 12 weeks’ pay).   
 
All employees are entitled to access unpaid parental leave under the Industrial Relations Act 
1996 NSW, 'including part timers and 'regular casuals' (s 53). Under the Industrial Relations 
Act 1999 Qld, only casual employees ‘who are engaged, by a particular employer on a regular 
and systematic basis, for several periods of employment during a period of at least two years’ 
are entitled to access parental leave provisions (s 16(1)(a)). If casual employees fulfil this 
requirement, they are then able to access only maternity leave provisions, not parental leave. 
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As parental leave is not provided for casual employees in Qld we again adjusted our data set. 
Of the AWAs examined 66 per cent of the comprehensive agreements were linked to 
legislation compared to 12 per cent for supplementary agreements. Parental leave is, however, 
one of the five conditions contained within the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions Standard, 
and therefore terms and conditions pertaining to parental leave in current agreements will 
continue to operate until the agreement expires.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Bray and Waring (2005) argue that the complexity of regulatory layering has not been 
examined in any depth in Australia.  We have made a start to address that issue.  Taken 
together, our descriptive statistics illustrate the entanglement of regulatory instruments in a 
sample of AWAs in one industry and across two states.  Interpreting what that evidence 
means to organisations and employees, however, is difficult.  There appears to have been very 
little effort by employers to incorporate a wider range of innovative provisions into AWAs to 
reward individual performance, as the vast majority of agreements, even when 
comprehensive, merely replicated existing terms and conditions in other regulatory 
instruments. As researchers we are anxious to explore and monitor implications.  While the 
conclusions we can draw from our exploratory analysis are limited, we can identify a number 
of issues of concern and areas where further research is needed.  
 
Recent ‘Work Choices’ amendments to the Workplace Relations Act 1996 has released the 
OEA from their responsibilities to ensure that AWAs meet legislative minima by passing the 
‘no disadvantage test’ (Waring et al, 2006).  Without the safeguard, or constraints, depending 
on your viewpoint, of the no-disadvantage test, it is an open question whether the incidence of 
AWAs, in general, and comprehensive agreements, in particular, will increase.  May (2005) 
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argues that the impact of the Australian Fair Pay Commission and the removal of the no- 
disadvantage test will lower minimum wages over time.  If true, it is reasonable to expect that 
employment terms and conditions will also be eroded.  Our analysis shows a higher 
proportion of comprehensive AWAs than Fetter and Mitchell’s (2004) earlier data set.  In 
both cases we cannot say that the sample of AWAs investigated is “representative” of the 
population of AWAs for the relevant industry. Also, we examine a snapshot of AWAs, we 
have not tracked changes in AWAs through time to assess the impact of changing economic 
conditions, changes to the underlying industrial legislation or growing familiarity by 
employers with a new industrial instrument.  It is important to determine whether this is a 
systemic trend related to employer preference or whether this difference is influenced by other 
factors, such as industry type, the time period examined, the size of the employing 
organisation or the relevant state award.  Further research is needed in other industries and in 
identical industries over different time periods to enable statistical comparisons, not only to 
track the use of AWAs but to examine the terms and conditions provided to assess how 
employees fare under the new arrangements.   
 
If the incidence of comprehensive AWAs is increasing, we speculate that some employers 
employ AWAs to enable erosion of long established employee terms and conditions.  We 
suspect that the more disengaged an AWA is from awards and legislation the more at risk 
workers will be in terms of the erosion of employment conditions relative to underlying 
awards and collective agreements.  A more detailed analysis of comprehensive AWAs across 
industry and through time is required in order to verify this suggestion.  Further research is 
needed to provide evidence of such fears.  Our data shows that some casual employees have 
already forfeited their access to long service leave entitlements, perhaps as a trade-off for 
higher wages, but this is not certain.  With the impending diminished role of the OEA as an 
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employee watchdog, we argue it is important that researchers analyse AWAs currently in 
operation.  Obtaining AWAs before the ‘Work Choices’ amendments take effect on new 
AWAs is desirable so that any findings can be used to benchmark changes in wages and 
working conditions in the future and to track the content and changes in AWAs through time. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of our research was to look beyond the types and content of provisions in a sample of 
AWAs within the retail industry.  We attempted to provide evidence of regulatory layering in 
a small number of provisions to illustrate the regulatory complexity on current AWAs. We 
found a sizeable proportion of AWAs linked to existing provisions in awards and legislation, 
and little substantive evidence of the individualisation of regulatory instruments offering 
innovative approaches to rewarding performance, however, these findings remain 
preliminary. Changes to existing awards or legislation therefore assume greater importance. 
Given that the Howard federal government in Australia is promoting more use of individual 
employment contracts, and given that the precise legal relationship between regulatory 
instruments is as yet unclear (Stewart 2005: 214), the effects of this complexity are also 
unclear. What is clear is that these changes do not make the workplace relations system 
simpler. 
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